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Abstract 
This paper argues that global value chains (GVCs) have functioned as a vehicle 
for “Made in China” products to enter international markets, especially the 
markets of high income countries. It identifies three spillover effects to Chinese 
firms participating in GVCs: brands, distribution networks and lead firms’ 
technology innovations. By participating in GVCs, Chinese firms are able to 
bundle low skilled labor services with advanced technologies and globally 
recognized brands, and then sell their low value added services to the 
consumers of international markets. The competitiveness of China’s processing 
exports is largely determined by more than 50% of foreign contents embedded 
in the exports. Using the panel data of bilateral processing exports covering 
more than 100 China’s trade partners, it shows there exists a significantly 
positive correlation between the share of processing exports and the income of 
trading partners, implying that processing trade is an effective means for “Made 
in China” products to enter high income countries. The cross-country 
heterogeneity of processing exports also indicates China captures relatively 
more value added in its exports to low income countries than to high income 
countries.  
Key Words: GVC, Export, China 
JEL: F14; F23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
* National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677 
Japan. Email: Yuqing_xing@grips.ac.jp.  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
After three and half decades of rapid economic growth, China has surpassed 
Germany, Japan and the US and emerged as the largest exporting nation. 
“Made in China” products are now ubiquitous in the markets of both developed 
and developing countries, ranging from labor-intensive products, such as T-
shirts and shoes to high-tech products mobile phones and digital cameras. For 
some consumers outside of China, it seems even impossible to live without 
“Made in China” products (Bongiomi, 2008).  
Why are China’s exports so competitive in the global market? What are major 
forces driving the worldwide expansion and diversification of its manufacturing 
exports?  Many academic scholars and China observers have tried to answer 
the questions from various aspects. A plethora of articles analyzing the drastic 
growth of China’s exports have been published in academic journals, 
magazines and newspapers. According to these studies, fundamental factors 
determining the significant growth and worldwide expansion of China’s exports 
include: (1) abundant labor endowment and corresponding comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive products (Adams, Gangnes and Shachmurove, 
2006; Wang 2006); (2) the reforms of domestic institutions, such as the 
transition to an market oriented economy, the adoption of export-led growth 
strategy and unilateral trade liberalization (Hu and Khan, 1997; Lin, Cai and Li, 
2003); (3)  improved market access for China’s exports through institutional 
arrangements, namely the WTO membership, bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements and the abolishment of multi-fiber arrangement (Branstetter 
and Lardy, 2006; Prasad, 2009); (4) the exchange rate regime adopted by the 
Chinese government and the undervalued currency (Naughton, 1996; Marquez 
and Schindler, 2007; Thorbecke and Smith, 2010);  and (5) massive inflows of 
export oriented foreign direct investment (Zhang and Song, 2000;  Whalley and 
Xin, 2010).   
With a population of more than 1.4 billion, China is naturally endowed with 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive products. Assuming other factors 
determining global competitiveness are equal across countries, relatively low 
labor cost should grant Chinese exports an edge over its competitors. Without 
any doubts, trade liberalization since 1990s in terms of tariff reductions and 
trade facilitations has improved substantially the market access of Chinese 
exports. Comparative advantage and trade liberalization arguments, however, 
mainly emphasize production costs and barriers to cross-country flows of goods, 
fail to take into consideration of the critical role performed by the organization 
structure of modern trade in promoting China’s exports, in particular its 
successful penetration into high income countries. Those studies actually leave 
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many important questions unanswered. Without foreign brands, could “Made in 
China” products maintain the same competitiveness? Whenever Apple 
launches new cutting-edge products, the shipment of Apple products from 
China to the rest of the world increases and continues to grow along with rising 
popularity of Apple products. Whom should be given the credit to for the 
increase, the innovative American company Apple, or the assembler Foxcon, a 
Taiwanese company located in mainland China, which has been banking on 
cheap Chinese labor? 
In the classic models of Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin, comparative advantage 
represents the sole factor determining competitiveness and trade patterns. 
Today’s trade, nonetheless, is not “wine for clothes”. The proliferation of global 
value chains has transformed trade in goods into trade in tasks (Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Many firms located in various geographic locations 
jointly deliver ready-to-use products to consumers of the global market. The 
comparative advantage of an individual country cannot decide the 
competitiveness of products manufactured along GVCs. Brands, global 
distribution networks and technology innovations perform far more important 
roles in determining winners and losers. GVCs are particular relevant to China’s 
exports, as about half of its manufacturing exports are assembled with imported 
parts and components, and most of so called “Made in China” products either 
carry brands owned by multinational enterprises (MNE) or are distributed by 
global retail giants such as Wal-Mart. 
In this paper, we attempt to interpret China’s export boom in the context of 
value chains. We argue that GVCs have been functioning as a vehicle for 
Chinese exports entering international markets, especially the market of high 
income countries. By successfully plugging into GVCs, Chinese firms have 
been able to bundle their low skilled labor services with globally recognized 
brands and advanced technologies of MNEs, and then sell them to consumers 
of international markets. GVCs are actually a catalyst for “Made in China” 
products, strictly speaking, China’s value added embedded in its manufacturing 
exports, being bought and consumed in various nations. Continuous technology 
innovations, aggressive promotions on brand and the worldwide development of 
distribution networks by the lead firms of GVCs, constantly expand and create 
new demand, which in turn lifting the demand for tasks performed by Chinese 
firms integrated with supply chains and eventually enhancing China’s exports.  
To establish the argument, we first examine tasks performed by Chinese firms 
in GVCs and domestic value added in its exports. The analysis starts with the 
case of the iPhone, of which has China been the exclusive exporter, then 
extends the coverage to high-tech products, where China was claimed the No. 
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1 exporter in the world (Meri, 2009), and further expand the scope to processing 
exports including both high-tech and ordinary manufacturing goods.  
Following the descriptive analysis, we empirically analyze the intensity of 
processing exports in China’s bilateral trade and its correlation with the income 
of destination markets. Processing exports refer to exports manufactured or 
assembled with imported parts and components. Assembly and processing are 
typical segments of value chains and belong to low value added tasks. 
Processing exports not only reveal tasks Chinese firms performed, but also 
provide a direct measure of exports due to the participation in value chains. The 
empirical investigation is based on a unique panel data set, covering China’s 
processing exports to more than 100 economies from 1993-2013. We find 
China’s processing exports mainly end up with high income countries and the 
intensity of processing exports, defined as the share of processing exports in 
bilateral exports has a significantly positive relation with the income of 
destination markets, implying that processing exports has functioned as an 
effective means for “Made in China” products to enter high income countries’ 
markets. The expansion and sustained high growth of China’s exports to high 
income countries benefit substantially from GVC’s spillover effects associated 
with brands, distribution networks and technology innovations.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follow.  In section 2, we will briefly 
summarize spillover effects of GVCs to Chinese firms involving in supply chains. 
The analysis focuses on spillover effects of brands, distribution networks and 
technology innovations; section 3 will discuss roles and tasks performed by 
Chinese firms in exports manufactured and traded along GVCs. The discussion 
concentrates on representative products--the iPhone, high-tech products and 
processing exports; in Section 4, we will investigate the relative importance of 
processing exports in China’s bilateral trade, and empirically analyze the 
correlation between the intensity of processing exports and the income of the 
trading partners; Section 5 summarizes main findings of the paper. 
 
2. Spillover Effects of Global Value Chains 
A global value chain comprises a series of tasks necessary for delivering a 
product from its inception to final consumers of international markets, including 
research and development, product design, manufacturing parts and 
components, assembly and distribution, which are carried out by firms located 
in various countries (Gereffi and Karina, 2011). According to governance 
structures, GVCs can be classified into producer-driven and buyer-driven value 
chains. Producer-driven chains are generally developed by technology leaders 
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in automobiles, aircraft, computers, semiconductors and other capital-intensive 
industries; buyer-driven chains are typically developed by large retailers, 
branded marketers and branded manufacturers (Gereffi, 1999).  In the context 
of property-rights model, the characterization of ownership allocation along  
value chains can also depend on the incentive to integrate suppliers and the 
elasticity of demand faced by the final-good producer (Antràs and Chor, 2013). 
Technology advancement, unprecedented liberalization in trade and investment 
and profit seeking behaviors of MNEs have been driving the emergence of 
GVCs in the last decades (OECD, 2013). Today, most of manufacturing 
commodities are actually produced and traded along value chains. GVCs have 
also extended into business process and management, such as software 
development and maintenance and voice services. Like an invisible hand, 
GVCs have interconnected national economies. The economic integration 
through value chains is fundamentally market driven and tends to be more 
stable and effective than the one led by institutional arrangements or defined by 
conventional arm-length trade. The theory of international trade suggests that 
specializations according to comparative advantage improve the efficiency of 
resource allocations and hence the welfare of trading nations. Compared with 
conventional specializations on industries or products, specializations on tasks 
defined by value chains further refine specializations among nations and 
enhance the efficiency of resource allocations, consequently raising the 
productivity and economy growth of all economies involved.  
Here we would like to emphasize spillover effects of GVCs at micro-level and 
discuss how the spillover effects generated by intangible assets of lead firms, 
such as brands, distribution networks and technology innovations, help Chinese 
firms overcome entry barriers of international markets and achieve dramatic 
global expansion. Cheap labor is often addressed as comparative advantage of 
Chinese firms. It seems that as long as they could manufacture products 
competitive at costs, they would be able to sell their products and compete in 
the global market. As a matter of fact, the competition in the global market is 
much more complicated than this kind of simple reasoning. Production costs are 
just one of many factors deciding the success in international markets. As 
barriers to entry in manufacturing fall, intangible assets such as brands and 
global distribution networks have turned into major hurdles to the firms of 
developing countries striving to take part in the world market (Kaplinski, 2000).  
Consumers of developed countries tend to be brand oriented and have high 
willingness to pay for particular brands. Brands are one of critical factors 
determining consumers’ choices (Bronnenberg, Dube and Gentzkow, 2012). 
Due to asymmetric information, consumers regard brands as an assurance of 
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product quality. Switching costs may also undermine consumers’ willingness to 
substitute preferred brands with new alternatives. Consumers’ biases to 
particular brands grant advantage to incumbent producers and raise barrier to 
new entries.  For instance, branded clothing constitute the majority of European 
clothing market with around 80% market share, only 20% left to private labels 
and non-branded clothing (Copenhagen Economics, 2013). Despite of more 
than three decades high growth, Chinese firms have not nurtured a significant 
number of globally recognized brands. So far only one Chinese brand Huawei is 
on the list of 2014 global brand chart. Creating and sustaining global brands 
require lavish advertising budget and global promotion campaigns, which is 
beyond the capacity of most Chinese firms at the early stage of their 
development. Owners of global brands usually lead buyer-driven value chains 
(Gereffi, 1999). By plugging into buyer-driven value chains as assemblers, part 
producers, or original equipment makers, Chinese firms are able to circumvent 
the disadvantage in brands and take the advantage of consumers’ preferences 
towards international brands. Compared with non-branded products with equal 
or even lower costs, the labels of international brands strengthen the 
competitiveness of “Made in China” products and enhance their appeal to 
consumers. The preferences of brand-oriented consumers are implicitly 
transformed into the demand for “Made in China” products. Without any doubts, 
China’s exports would fall substantially if foreign brands attached were taken off. 
In addition, to a large extent, new and fast growing markets have been nurtured 
by technology innovations and product inventions. Revolutionary innovations in 
information and communication technology (ICT) have given rise to a variety of 
new products, such as laptop computers, smart phones and tablets, thus 
dramatically stimulating consumers’ demand beyond traditional commodities. In 
2012, ICT goods emerged as one of top products traded globally. The world 
imports of ICT goods rose to US$2 trillion, about 11% of world merchandise 
trade and exceeded trade in agriculture and motor vehicle (UNCTAD, 2014). If 
not all, most of intellectual properties of ICT products are owned by MNEs of 
developed countries. Compared with established MNEs, Chinese firms do not 
have comparative advantage in high-tech products. Constrained by limited 
human resources, insufficient investment in research and development, and 
relatively short learning-by-doing history, it would be very challenging for 
Chinese firms to market products with their own intellectual properties and 
compete with incumbent technology leaders. The global expansion of value 
chains, on the other hand, offers an alternative path for Chinese firms to 
participate in the markets of high-tech products and benefit fast growing 
demand of these products, regardless their disadvantages. By participating in 
the value chains of high-tech products and specializing on low value added 
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segments, such as assembly and the production of low-tech components, 
Chinese firms are able to join the value creation process of high-tech products 
and grow together with lead firms. The unit value added of the segment may be 
relatively small, for instance assembly adds only $6.5 per iPhone (Xing and 
Detert, 2010), the sheer size of the world market implies a huge growth 
potential and economies of scales. Being a part of value chains, Chinese firms 
can enjoy the spillover effect of lead firms’ technology innovations of lead firms. 
It is imperative to clarify that the spillover emphasized here is not the one 
defined in the conventional literature on technology and productivity growth. It 
refers to opportunities of joining and benefiting from the markets of high-tech 
products, where Chinese firms have neither necessary intellectual properties 
nor comparative advantage. As a matter of fact, China’s leading positions in 
exports of laptop computers, digital cameras, mobiles and other similar ICT 
products have been achieved via specializing on low value added task-
assembly of those products rather than indigenous technology innovations.  
Finally, selling products in world markets requires global distribution networks. 
The existence of basic marketing and distribution infrastructure is prerequisite 
for supply and demand to be interconnected with one another. The buyer-seller 
links between exporters and overseas buyers is an important channel for the 
diffusion of knowledge and information (Wgan and Mody, 1992). In any value 
chains, lead firms are buyers and responsible for marketing and distribution. 
They set up product standards and instruct suppliers at upstream of chains 
about what, how, when and where to be produced. Through such contacts 
suppliers learn the nature of potential market and lead firms exercises direct 
quality control, and often transfer valuable design packaging and production 
know-how to suppliers (Gereffi, 1999). Hence, the required buyer-seller 
relations for exporting commodities to foreign markets are naturally built in 
GVCs. For firms without their own global distribution networks, joining GVCs 
can mitigate information deficiency, reduce transaction costs and facilitate the 
market access. Taking advantage of GVC’s spillover effects in distribution 
networks, Chinese firms involving in GVCs have not only entered the world 
market successfully, but also been free of concerns on distributing their 
products to consumers in dispersed geographic locations. For example, Wal-
Mart, if counted as a “nation”, is the 7th largest trading partner of China and 
importing more than $18 billion goods from China annually (Lee, Gereffi and 
Barrientos, 2011). The retail networks of Wal-Mart provide essential marketing 
and distributions infrastructure for “Made in China” products. The Chinese 
suppliers of Wal-Mart use the retail networks as a vehicle to reach consumers 
of the US and other foreign markets. 
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3. GVCs and the Global Expansion of China’s Exports 
In this section, we will take a few representative goods as examples to 
intuitively illustrate the contribution of GVCs to the global expansion of Chinese 
exports. Since the launch of the first generation iPhone, China has been the 
exclusive exporter of the iPhone. In 2009, it exported 11.3 million iPhones 
valued at $2.0 billion to the US. In spite of rising wage and cumulative 
appreciation of the Yuan, China’s iPhone export to the US continued to grow 
and surged to $8.5 billion, more than tripled in 2012.  During the same period, 
Chinese Yuan appreciated 8.2% against the US dollar from $1 for 6.83 Yuan to 
6.31 Yuan. The average annual wage of Chinese workers rose close to 50% 
from 34,000 Yuan to 50,000 Yuan. In terms of the exchange rate and wage, 
China’s comparative advantage in labor cost actually deteriorated, thus cannot 
explain the drastic increase of the iPhone export.    
Furthermore, that China exports the iPhone to the US, where the iPhone was 
invented, appears inconsistent with the classic theory of comparative advantage. 
The strange trade pattern, however, can easily be explained by GVCs. On the 
back of each iPhone, there is a statement “Designed by Apple in California 
Assembled in China” The message unambiguously reveals the actual task 
performed by China in manufacturing iPhones. Compared with other smart 
phones, the iPhone is the most expensive one with more than 60% gross profit 
margin (Xing and Detert, 2010). The value chain of the iPhone is governed by 
Apple. Therefore, the competitiveness of the iPhone and its fast global 
expansion should be attributed to technology innovations of Apple rather than 
China’s comparative advantage—low labor cost. It is critical to emphasize what 
China exports via the iPhone is the services of low skilled labor but advanced 
technology. It is the iPhone supply chain that provides the opportunity for 
Chinese firms to sell labor services to all users of the iPhone. The international 
production fragmentation of the iPhone enables Chinese firms to be one of the 
beneficiaries of Apple’s technology innovations.  
The iPhone trade is not unique. Most of China’s exports in high-tech products 
follow the same fashion. They are manufactured and delivered via various 
GVCs. In recent years, high-tech products have emerged as a major export 
item, accounting for about one third of China’s total manufacturing exports. In 
2012, China exported US$600 billion high-tech goods, more than ten times 
higher compared with in 2002. The exponential growth of high-tech exports has 
been driven by the extension of high-tech supply chains into China. To a great 
extent, it is the international fragmentations of high-tech manufacturing 
processes that bring Chinese firms into the game of exporting high-tech 
products. In order to utilize China’s abundant labor, many high-tech MNEs have 
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relocated manufacturing facilities into China or outsourced low value added 
tasks to firms there. According to Xing (2014b), foreign invested firms produce 
more than 80% of China’s high-tech exports. More importantly, about 80% of 
China’s high-tech exports falls into the category of processing trade and has 
relatively low domestic value added. Domestic value added in exports 
measures the dependence of exports on foreign contents and the vertical 
integration of its industries with international production networks. Figure 1 
shows the share of domestic value added of China’s processing high-tech 
exports from1997 to 2012. It was as low as 25% in 1997 and gradually 
increased to 45% by 2012. Despite of the substantial increase in domestic 
contents, foreign value added remains above 50%, suggesting that processing 
high-tech exports are a result of GVC operations. Given that most of key 
components used in high-tech exports are imported and Chinese firms perform 
mainly low skilled tasks, the technology sophistication of China’s high-tech 
exports is primarily determined by technology innovations of lead firms. In other 
words, the technology spillovers of GVCs raise the sophistication and the 
competitiveness of China’s processing high-tech exports, thus eventually 
fostering its rapid expansion in the global market. Some researchers (e.g., 
Brenstterder and Lardy, 2006) argue that these products are not high-tech but 
commodities as they can be manufactured with large volume. We do not agree 
with the argument. These products still represent technology frontiers, but the 
tasks performed by Chinese firms, such as assembly and making non-core 
components are low skilled. 
 Figure 1 
 
Source: Xing (2014a) 
To investigate the critical role of GVCs beyond high-tech exports, we extend the 
discussion into processing exports, a subset of GVCs’ activities. Since China 
adopted export-led growth strategy, processing exports has been promoted as 
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a major trade regime. In 2012, it amounted US$860 billion, about 42% of 
China’s total exports. During the high growth period of 1997-2007, it grew faster 
than ordinary exports and generally exceeded 50% of China’s total exports 
(Figure 2). Foreign invested firms play a dominant role in processing exports 
and responsible for more than 75% (Ma and Assche, 2011). The analysis on the 
geographic origins of processing imports—inputs used for producing exports 
and the destination markets of processing exports shows that, East Asian 
economies are the major origins while G-7 countries the main destination (Xing, 
2010). The triangle trade pattern formed by processing trade outlines an 
aggregated GVC with China in the middle. Similar to processing high-tech 
exports, foreign value added accounts for a large portion of the value added in 
processing exports.  
Figure 2: Processing Exports and the Domestic Value Added 
 
Source: Xing (2014a) 
Figure 2 shows estimated domestic value added in two distinctive groups of 
processing exports: one with imported materials and the other with supplied 
materials by foreign contractors. In the former, the share of domestic content 
averaged 33% and the latter 23% during the period of 1993-2012. The 
significantly low share of domestic value added suggests the excessive 
dependence of processing exports on foreign contents and the high degree of 
vertical integration with foreign firms. In fact, in the case of processing exports 
with supplied materials, Chinese firms simply assemble supplied parts and 
components together and then send assembled products to foreign contractors, 
who are responsible for product designs, material procurements and marketing. 
Therefore, through different channels and at different fragments of GVCs, 
brands, distribution networks and technology innovations have all contributed to 
the rapid growth and impressive global expansion of China’s processing exports. 
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4. Processing Exports and China’s Exports to High Income 
Countries 
China has turned into the largest import source of the US, Japan and European 
Union. The shares of China’s exports in these markets are disproportionally 
high compared with its weight in the world economy. Generally the markets of 
high income countries tend to be more competitive and thus more challenging 
for firms of developing countries to enter and gain market shares. As argued 
above, firms participating in GVCs are able to benefit from brands, technology 
innovations and distribution networks, which are indispensable for competing in 
the global market. A few studies (e.g., Ma and Assche, 2011; Xing, 2012) show 
that China’s processing exports mainly end up with the markets of the US, 
Japan and EU. By the definition, processing exports are synonymous with 
GVCs. The significant presence of processing exports actually underlines the 
vehicle role of GVCs in facilitating “Made in China” products to enter high 
income countries.  
Figure 3. The Intensities of Processing Exports in China’s Exports to 
Selected countries 
 
Sources: the authors’ calculation 
To empirically investigate the vehicle role of processing trade, we first calculate 
the share of processing exports in China’s exports to six individual countries: 
the US, Japan, Germany, Turkey, India and Vietnam. All of them are important 
trading partners of China and represent high, middle and low income countries 
respectively. Figure 3 summarizes the results of 1993 to 2013. It is 
straightforward to see a divergence between high (the US, Japan and Germany) 
and low-income (India and Vietnam) countries. In the former, processing 
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exports accounted for more than 55% on average while in the latter about 20%. 
Specifically, processing exports comprised about 65% of China’s exports to the 
US on average and even exceeded 70% during the period of 1996-1999. Before 
2005, processing exports to both Japan and Germany grew rapidly, much faster 
than ordinary exports. As a result, the share of processing export to Japan rose 
to 59% in 2005 from 43% in 1993 while to Germany increased to 62% from 54%. 
In recent years, the share of processing exports gradually declined from the 
peak but remained more than 50% for the US and Japan.  
In contrast, processing exports on average accounted for 30% of China’s 
exports to Turkey, 23% to India and 21% to Vietnam during the period, much 
lower than to high income countries. The simple descriptive statistics implies 
that processing exports weight much more in China’s exports to high income 
countries than to low income ones. To examine the stability of the correlation, 
we expand the sample size by including all of China’s partners in processing 
exports in 2012. The sample consists of 115 countries. We use the sample to 
draw a scatter chart of the share of processing exports vs the income of the 
destination markets. Figure 4 shows the scatter chart, where the horizontal axis 
denotes the share of processing exports and the vertical axis GDP per capita. 
The logarithm of both variables is used in the chart. It unambiguously reveals a 
positive log-linear relation between the share of processing exports and the 
income, suggesting that the share of processing exports grows as the income 
rises and high income countries receive relatively more processing exports than 
low income countries.  
Figure 4. The Correlation between the share of processing exports and the 
income of China’s trading partners in 2012 
 
 
Sources: the authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 3 and 4 provide intuitive evidence on the possible correlation between 
the share of processing exports and the income of China’s trading partners. 
Now we turn to the regression analysis of the relationship. 
To formally test the correlation, we specify the model below: 
   
 
where pjt represents the share of processing exports in China’s exports to 
country j, defined as the ratios of processing exports to total exports to country j 
in year t. The specified model can be considered as a derivative of two gravity 
equations, one is the gravity equation of processing exports and the other the 
gravity equation of total exports. Since GDP of China and its trading partners as 
well as geographic distance are usually included in gravity equations, these 
variables are assumed to be cancelled out in the ratio. yjt denotes GDP per 
capita of country j. It measures preferences of foreign consumers to processing 
exports. As argued above, consumers of developed economies tend to have 
strong preferences toward branded and technology goods. Figure 3 and 4 
intuitively suggest the correlation between the intensity of processing exports 
and the income level of China’s trading partner. yjt is the focus of the estimation. 
exust represents the nominal exchange rate of the Yuan to the US dollar, 
calculated as the price of the US dollar in terms of Chinese Yuan. We use the 
exchange rate of the Yuan to the dollar rather than bilateral exchange rates 
because of two reasons. First, more than 80% of China’s exports are priced and 
settled in the US dollar. Second, processing exports is a subset of GVC’s 
activities. In general, only one currency, usually the US dollar, is used to settle 
transactions between firms involved in same GVCs.    
EA is a dummy variable, proxying the impact of GVCs in East Asia. GVCs show 
significant regional bias. Chinese companies engaging processing exports 
mainly take part in the production networks in East Asia. It is necessary to 
include a dummy variable to capture the regional bias. EA takes 1 if j belongs to 
East Asia, zero otherwise. WTO is another dummy, testing the impact of 
China’s entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001. It is equal to 1 after 
2001, zero otherwise. Epot is also a dummy variable and identifies the trading 
partners serving as an entrport, where a substantial part of China’s exports to 
these economies is re-exported to third countries. Hong Kong, Macao and 
Luxembourg are defined as entrepots in the estimation. The independent 
variable T is employed to capture the trend of processing exports. 
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Data used for the estimation is drawn from various sources. Statistics on 
bilateral processing exports and total exports covering 21 years from 1993-2013 
are provided by the office of China Custom.  GDP per capita and foreign 
exchange rates are downloaded from World Bank World Development 
Indicators and the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund. After preparing variables for estimation, there are 2401 observations. We 
test the stationarity of the dependent variable Ln(pjt) and the result shows that it 
is stationary. Table 1 reports estimation results based on ordinary least squared 
(OLS) and the fixed effect model. The estimates of the OLS are listed as 
references. Here we only explain the estimates of the fixed effect model.  
The R-squared shows that the fixed effect model can explain 72% of the 
variation of the dependent variable. The coefficient of GDP per capita y is 0.705 
and statistically significant at 1%, implying that the share of processing exports 
to high income countries is larger than that to lower income countries. It 
supports our hypothesis that processing exports function as an effective vehicle 
for Chinese exports to enter the markets of developed countries. A 1% increase 
in GDP per capita will be expected to raise the share of processing exports 2 
percentage point. The coefficient of the exchange rate exust is 0.392 and 
statistically significant at 1%. exust is the price of the dollar in terms of Chinese 
Yuan.  The positive coefficient implies that the depreciation of the Yuan against 
the US dollar would increase the share of processing exports and vice versa. 
According to the estimate, a 1% appreciation of the Yuan would give rise to 
1.48 percentage point decrease in the share of processing exports. Chinese 
Yuan has appreciated about 35% cumulatively against the US dollar since 2005. 
Meanwhile, the share of processing exports in China’s total exports fell to 39% 
in 2013 from its peak 57%. The empirical result provides evidence that the 
appreciation of the Yuan undermined China’s comparative advantage in  the 
assembly task of GVCs, thus undercutting the overall growth of China’s exports.  
The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable T is -0.0157 and statistically 
significant at 1%, suggesting that the share of processing exports trended lower.  
The WTO dummy is positive but insignificant.  
Moreover, the empricial result reveals that, China’s processing exports are not 
uniformly distributed across trading partners, and there exists siginficant cross-
country heterogeneity, which is correlated with incomes. As demonstrated 
earlier, processing exports incorporate more than 50% of foreign value added. 
To a large extent, the share of processing exports determines the proportion of 
domestic value added embedded in China’s exports.  The Low intensity of 
processing exports implies high domestic value added in exports. In other 
words, China caputres relatively more value added in its exports to low income 
countries compared with to high income ones.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
As the center of global assembly, Chinese exporting firms have been closedly 
integrated with GVCs. Besides the intrinsic comparative advanatge, the rapid 
growth and worldwide expansion of China’s exports should be examined in the 
context of GVCs. For investigating the contribution of GVCs to China’s exports, 
in particular the exports to the markets of high income countires, we focuse on 
processing exports, a subset of GVC activies. Our analsyis shows that, China’s 
processing exports benefit substantially from the spilliver effects of GVCs in 
brands, global distribution networks and technology innovations of lead firms. 
By taking part in GVCs, Chinese firms can bundle low skilled labor services with 
globally recoganized brands and advanced technology, then sell to global 
consumers. More than 50% foreign value added imbeded in processing exports 
suggest that, to a large extent the competitiveness of processing exports is 
determined by foreign contents rather than China’s comparative advantage and 
indigenous technology innovations.  
Procesing exports actually fucntion as a vehicle for “Made in China” to enter the 
markets of high income countries. While the share of processing exports to high 
income countries, such as the US and Japan exceed more than 50%, the share 
to low income countries is as low as 20%. The regression analysis shows that 
there exists a significant postive correlation between the share of processing 
exports and the income of import countries, providing empirical evidence on the 
facilitating role of GVCs for “Made in China” products to penentrate the markets 
of high income countries. The cross-country heterogeneity of processing 
exports suggests that, China actually captures relatively more value added from 
its exports to low income countries than to high income ones. 
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Table 1.  Processing Exports and Income of Trading Partners  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Estimation  Fixed Effect  
     
Ln(y)  0.299*** 0.705*** 
 (0.00777) (0.0984) 
Ln(ex)  0.372** 0.392*** 
 (0.153) (0.121) 
EAD 0.539***  
 (0.0275)  
WTO  -0.0381 -0.0391 
 (0.0492) (0.0330) 
Eport  0.123**  
 (0.0500)  
t  -0.00655 -0.0157*** 
 (0.00507) (0.00435) 
Constant 8.276 23.29*** 
 (10.32) (8.500) 
   
Observations 2,401 2,401 
R-squared 0.434 0.722 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation, standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**,*) 
denotes statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) percent level 
